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Abstract 
 
Increasingly, sellers are offering goods characterized by probabilistic quality.  In such 
offers, buyers receive a synthetic product comprising of a lottery between two vertically 
differentiated goods.  Given this emerging practice, I formally investigate the design and 
pricing of probabilistic quality.  In this dissertation, I ask: How does probabilistic selling 
improve seller profits in vertical markets?  When probabilistic quality is optimal, how is it 
designed; in particular, how are the associated probability, pricing, and product set 
determined?  Further, what is the impact of transaction costs on the design of probabilistic 
quality?   Next, what is the impact of probabilistic selling on consumer surplus? Finally, will 
probabilistic quality arise under demand uncertainty? 
My analysis reveals that probabilistic quality can enhance seller profits via three 
distinct routes: profitably disposing excess capacity, better targeting of the high-quality 
product, and greater market coverage. In addition, transaction costs can play a critical role on 
the emergence and manner of emergence of probabilistic quality.  Next, I find that 
probabilistic quality can potentially enhance consumer surplus even though its 
implementation necessitates a dissipative transaction cost.   Finally, I find that probabilistic 
quality is robust to considerations of demand uncertainty. 
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Design and Pricing of Probabilistic Quality 
   
1.  INTRODUCTION  
 
 Consider the following observed market practices.  An internet broadband service 
provider offers two levels of service: Gold and Palladium.  The Gold service is priced at 
$59.95 and offers a guaranteed download speed of 50Mbs.  The Palladium service, on the 
other hand, is priced lower at $49.95 but the download speed varies between 20Mbs and 
50Mbps.  Next, a major theme park offers two types of tickets:  a higher-priced ticket that 
allows patrons to join a line with substantially reduced waiting times and a lower-priced 
offering that is restricted to the regular line.  This regular line may sometimes have reduced 
waiting times and at other times suffer from long waiting times.  Similarly, a racquet club 
offers two levels of pricing for court time: a higher rate for guaranteed court availability and a 
lower rate which provides court time only as capacity becomes available.  Again, the lower 
rate may sometimes yield a court immediately but at other times may involve substantial 
waiting.  Finally, a hotel offers three distinct products: a premium suite at a high price with 
guaranteed availability, a standard offering at a low price, and the premium suite at 
intermediate price but subject to availability failing which the standard offering is provided.     
Notice that in all of these examples, one of the products in the product line essentially 
amounts to a lottery between two vertically differentiated goods.  I refer to such a synthetic 
product as probabilistic quality and the associated sales practice as probabilistic selling, a 
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nomenclature in the spirit of Fay and Xie (2008).   Given growing use of this practice, I 
formally investigate the design and pricing of probabilistic quality.  Specifically, my research 
aims to answer the following questions:  
 How does probabilistic selling improve seller profits in vertical markets?  
What are the essential trade-offs involved in employing this selling format?  
 When probabilistic quality is optimal, how should it be designed?  In 
particular, how are the probability and price associated with probabilistic 
quality determined?  In addition, should probabilistic quality be offered in 
tandem with the low-quality product, the high-quality product, or both?   
 What is the impact of transaction costs on the design of probabilistic quality?  
 Finally, what is the impact of probabilistic selling on consumer surplus?  
 
I believe that my answers to these questions and attendant insights build on the 
burgeoning literature on the probabilistic aspects of market exchanges (see, for example, Fay 
2008; Fay and Xie 2008, Fay and Xie 2010, Shugan and Xie 2000, Biyalagorsky, Gerstner, 
Weiss and Xie 2005).  Further, the world-wide growth in services and the nature of 
technological developments further portends increased use of the basic segmentation scheme 
inherent in probabilistic selling. The reasoning behind this prediction is as follows.  The 
implementation of probabilistic selling requires that customers be limited in their ability to 
arbitrage products.   In the case of physical goods, customers (or entrepreneurial middleman) 
can always re-market the products and thereby undo the segmentation schemes of the 
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marketer.    Such arbitrage is relatively difficult in the case of services because consumption 
requires the presence of the customer.  Similarly, from a technological perspective, the use of 
electronic smart cards embedded with bio-metric identification devices further constrains 
service delivery to the purchaser (Shugan and Xie 2004).    
The rest of the study is organized in the following manner.  In the next section, I 
briefly review the background literature and position my contributions in relation to the extant 
work.  Then, I present my model, analysis, and findings.  Finally, I conclude with a discussion 
of my key findings and outline directions for future research. 
 
2.  LITERATURE REVIEW AND POSITIONING 
 
There is a growing body of research in marketing that analyses the uncertainty 
inherent in market exchanges.  The extant literature has highlighted two main aspects of 
uncertainty:  uncertainty in buyer’s consumption state and uncertainty in product offered.   
Uncertainty in buyer’s consumption state refers to the fact that buyers are often unsure about 
how much they value a future product.  For example, buyers may be uncertain as to how 
strongly they will crave Chinese cuisine on some future occasion (Shugan and Xie 2000; Xie 
and Shugan 2001).  In effect, this body of research introduces the notion of uncertainty in 
buyer consumption state to reflect the fact that the utility obtained by buyers is likely to be 
influenced by various personal factors such as mood, work schedule, and family situation. 
These researchers then demonstrate the profit-enhancing ability of advance selling.   Such 
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profit improvement arises because advance selling allows the contract to be inked when both 
parties are equally uncertain about future consumption utilities.   
In contrast, uncertainty in product offered occurs when sellers engage in probabilistic 
selling.  Here, the seller offers a good that essentially consists of a lottery between two 
distinct goods.  Fay and Xie (2008) demonstrate how probabilistic selling can enhance profits 
via enhanced price-discrimination and market expansion.  In effect, introduction of the 
probabilistic good allows the seller to separate consumers with strong preferences (who buy 
the component goods) from consumers with weak preferences (who buy the probabilistic 
good) thus enhancing prices for the component goods. Further, probabilistic selling facilitates 
market expansion by allowing the seller to promote the probabilistic good to low-valuation 
customers who would not have otherwise entered the market.   
Finally, recent work has also compared the selling strategies that arise from the two 
sources of uncertainty, namely, uncertainty in buyer’s consumption state and uncertainty in 
product offered.  Specifically, Fay and Xie (2010) demonstrate the market characteristics that 
influence the profitability of advance selling relative to probabilistic selling.    
Within this stream of research, my work is closest to that of Fay and Xie (2008).  
However, my problem context and results differ markedly from that of Fay and Xie (2008).  
In my context, a seller has two vertically differentiated products on hand, and, on account of 
demand uncertainty, faces excess capacity with respect to the high-quality product.  In 
contrast, Fay and Xie (2008) primarily focus on a horizontal context.  The key differences in 
results and insights are as follows.  First, in Fay and Xie (2008), the probability associated 
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with the probabilistic offer is primarily derived to be 
1
2
; deviating from this level in either 
direction increases cannibalization and also reduces demand.   In my work, however, the 
probability associated with probabilistic quality will, in general, be something other than 
1
2
.  
Indeed, the derivation of this probability and related comparative statics in terms of model 
parameters is a key contribution of my work.  In addition, I also introduce the notion of 
transaction costs associated with probabilistic quality.   The need for such a parameter is 
foreshadowed in Fay and Xie (2008) and I extend their conceptualization to explicitly 
demonstrate its impact on the design and pricing of probabilistic quality.    Next, their product 
line always includes the two extreme products and the intermediate probabilistic product.  In 
contrast, in my work, the product line sometimes includes the two extreme products and the 
intermediate probabilistic product and at other times includes only the high-quality product 
and the intermediate probabilistic quality.   Moreover, I am also able to demonstrate 
improvement in consumer surplus via two routes:  lower prices enjoyed by consumers or 
targeting high-quality to those who value it greatly.  Finally, although Fay and Xie (2008) also 
demonstrate the optimality of probabilistic selling for vertical markets, the vertical market that 
I utilize has a preference structure that is somewhat different from that employed in Fay and 
Xie (2008).  I will clarify this difference more precisely in a later section.   
In a related stream of work, Biyalagorsky, Gerstner, Weiss, and Xie (2005) analyze 
probabilistic quality in the context of service upgrades wherein buyers of upgradeable tickets 
face a lottery between two classes of service.  While my work is closely related to their 
analysis, my problem context and results differ in the following manner.  In their model, 
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buyers of upgradeable tickets receive the higher class of service only if the high-type buyer 
fails to show up in the second period; moreover, this probability is exogenous to their 
analysis.  In contrast, and as mentioned previously, I explicitly consider the probability of 
receiving the high-quality product as a decision variable.  Further, in their model, there is no 
degradation in price paid by the high-type consumer for the high-quality product on account 
of introducing probabilistic quality.  This is because the two offers are temporally separate 
and the high-type consumer only appears in the second period.    However, in my research, as 
in Fay and Xie (2008), all consumers appear simultaneously.  As such, the introduction of 
probabilistic quality leads to “cannibalization” of the margin that the seller can obtain from 
sale of the high-quality product.  These differences distinguish my work in important ways 
from the research of Biyalagorsky, Gerstner, Weiss, and Xie (2005).    
Finally, my study also builds on the extant research on product line design.  Deneckere 
and McAfee (1996) and Moorthy and Png (1992) focus on a vertical market characterized by 
two segments that differ in their taste for quality.    They then analyze issues related to 
optimal product line design such as purposeful degradation of quality offered to low-type 
consumers in order to reduce cannibalization.  While I use many of their analysis techniques 
in my research, I differ primarily in that I introduce a synthetic third product which is a 
combination of the low-quality and high-quality product. Thus, in my research, I increase 
cannibalization on account of introduction of a product that is closer to the high-quality 
product than the low-quality product. Nevertheless, I demonstrate how this practice can 
potentially enhance seller profits.   Moreover, the design and pricing of such an enhanced 
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product that is essentially probabilistic in nature is a key contribution of my work.  It is in this 
way that I complement the extant research on product line design.   
  
3.  MODEL AND ANALYSIS 
 
I begin by describing the key elements of my model.  Next, I present my analysis that 
responds to the questions that I seek to address in my research endeavor.   I partition my 
analysis into two parts.  In the main part, I derive findings pertaining to probabilistic quality 
in a world where capacity level for the high-quality product is given and exceeds demand.  
My characterization of the design and pricing of probabilistic quality is confined to this world.  
However, in additional analysis, I incorporate demand uncertainty and endogenize capacity 
choice to demonstrate that a world in which capacity exceeds demand can indeed arise in the 
first place.  
 
3.1 Model  
3.1.1 Basic Features 
My model setting consists of a monopolist with two goods:  a high-quality service and 
a low-quality service.  In addition to these two vertically differentiated goods, the seller also 
has the option to include a synthetic product that essentially amounts to a lottery between the 
two goods.  When offering probabilistic quality in this fashion, the seller offers the high-
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quality good with some pre-announced level of probability,  .  Correspondingly, this implies 
that the seller offers the low-quality good with probability    .     
An important issue that arises here is that related to the implementation of such a 
synthetic product.  In particular, since buyers only observe binary outcomes (high- or low-
quality and not the entire distribution of probabilistic sales), there is a need for verification of 
the pre-announced level of probability.  Absent such verification, the seller could very easily 
announce a probabilistic product that is priced at a premium relative to the low-quality 
product but pack it completely with the low-quality product.  Of course, rational consumers 
anticipate this and probabilistic selling thus unravels.  Indeed, this very issue has been 
foreshadowed and detailed by Fay and Xie (2008, p. 685).  In response, they suggest that 
seller reputation, independent reviews or a channel intermediary could perform this 
verification function in the face of such seller opportunism.    Interestingly, this issue has also 
been raised in Moorthy and Png (1992).  In particular, they highlight the role of credible 
commitment by the seller with respect to the decision variables of quality, price, and the order 
in which the products are introduced.   In like fashion, they suggest that seller reputation, 
industry practice, or cost of reneging all influence the credibility of commitment.    
While all these mechanisms are feasible, I assume that utilizing an intermediary is the 
most efficient route to effect verification of the specific probability announced by the seller – 
building a reputation or relying on independent reviews are indirect mechanisms and will 
likely require more investment.  Further, I posit that such verification is obtained at a 
transaction cost, c, per unit of the probabilistic offering that is sold.   This is consistent with 
what is observed in the online gaming industry where online casinos post “odds.”   In 
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particular, the software platforms employed by online casinos rely on random number 
generators that are licensed and audited by third-party vendors (see, for example: 
http://www.casinocashjourney.com/merge-gaming-network-software.htm).  I anticipate that 
sellers intent on realizing the promise inherent in probabilistic selling will likely have to 
follow a similar route.  This is because the essence of implementing probabilistic quality 
revolves around the “odds” of receiving high-quality. 
 
3.1.2 Capacity, Demand, and Valuations  
The seller has capacity M for the high-quality service and N for the low-quality service 
with M < N.  This last assumption is consistent with anecdotal evidence that sellers of two 
quality tiers generally offer more low-quality capacity.  The associated variable costs for 
offering the high-quality and low-quality services are    and    respectively, with       
and    normalized to zero.   
I next assume that there are two types of consumers in the market, high-type and low-
type, with market sizes    and   , respectively.    In my research, I assume that low-type 
consumers constitute the mass market and they are numerous; consequently, they exceed the 
entire capacity of the seller (i.e.,       , and I will provide an explanation for why I 
invoke this assumption at a later point).  However, the number of high-type customers is 
strictly less than the seller’s capacity of high-quality (i.e.,           Then, an important 
question that arises is why the seller will ever choose to build high-quality capacity that 
exceeds demand.  I posit the following intuitive reason: demand uncertainty.  Accordingly, in 
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additional analysis, I incorporate demand uncertainty for the high-quality product and 
explicitly endogenize the associated capacity choice.  I then show that the optimal capacity 
choice for the high-quality product, M*, exceeds the lower bound for the support of   .  In 
this way, I demonstrate that the world in which my analysis is conducted (namely,       ) 
can indeed arise in the first place.  
  I further posit that the two types of consumers have different valuations for the two 
levels of services. The high-type consumers’ value high-quality at     and low-quality at    , 
with        .  The low-type consumers value high-quality at     and low-quality at    , 
with        .  I also expect         and        .  Finally, I denote             
                                        and expect > 0.    That is, in addition to 
their stronger preference for a given level of quality, high-type consumers value successive 
levels of quality even more than low-type consumers. This assumption is consistent with the 
basic vertical model presented in Tirole (1988, p. 296) and is frequently employed in the 
marketing literature (see, for example, Moorthy and Png 1992).  
At this point, I compare my preference structure to that of Fay and Xie (2008) where 
they extend their analysis of horizontal differentiation to the case of vertical differentiation (p. 
681).  I highlight that there are subtle, but important, differences in the preference structure 
assumed between their work and mine.  While both sets of researchers assume         and 
        and > 0, I assume          whereas Fay and Xie (2008) assume        .   In 
effect, I conceptualize that high-quality users are simply more “intense” users in that they 
value any quality level (e.g., 50 Mbps or 20Mbs) more than the low-quality user.    In 
contrast, Fay and Xie (2008) conceptualize that the high-type consumer demonstrates 
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“threshold” effects with respect to quality.  For instance, if the high-type watches streaming 
movies and the low-type browses, the high-type gets little or no value from the 20Mbs 
product whereas the low-type does.   In my work, I consider the “intensity” interpretation but 
fully recognize that the “threshold” interpretation is also likely to be an equally important 
characterization of real-world vertical markets.    Interestingly, I note that these alternate 
preference structures may even occur within the same product line but across different 
product sets.  For example, in the automobile market, Lexus / Camry may have the Fay and 
Xie (2008) preference structure because of snob effects whereas Camry / Corolla may have 
my proposed preference structure.  Again, this discussion suggests that vertical markets may 
differ in preference structure and it is important to recognize these distinctions across different 
research endeavors.   Substantively, considering        , as opposed to         
heightens cannibalization - one can thus rightfully doubt the emergence of probabilistic 
quality in my setting, further justifying my formal inquiry.  
Within my model, consumers and sellers behave as follows.  Consumers take their 
valuations as given and choose a service, with its associated price, so as to maximize utility.  
This utility comprises of valuation for the service less the price charged by the seller.  Sellers, 
on the other hand, take segments and valuations as given and offer products and set prices to 
maximize their profits. 
1
 I reiterate that in my model, as in Fay and Xie (2008), all consumers 
appear simultaneously and the resolution of which product the consumer receives upon 
purchasing probabilistic quality is immediate.  Finally, if there are more buyers for a product 
                                                          
1
 An additional assumption that I invoke pertaining to valuations is:              . That is, it is profitable to 
introduce high-quality. 
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than offered by the seller then allocation is purely random.  Before I discuss my analysis, it is 
useful to discuss three benchmarks that the seller has at his (or her) disposal.  
 
3.1.3 Benchmarks 
There are three strategies that the seller can adopt.  In the first, the seller offers high-
quality service to the high-type consumer and low-quality service to low-type consumers 
yielding the traditional differentiated product line strategy.  I label this strategy as Benchmark 
1.  Following Moorthy and Png (1992), I posit that the high-quality product is targeted to the 
high-type segment and the low-quality product is targeted to the low-type segment.  
Moreover, the seller charges     for the low-quality product and                for the 
high-quality product.  The price for the high-quality product,    , is obtained from the 
incentive-compatibility constraint such that the high-type consumer is just indifferent between 
consuming the high- and low-quality products:                       I call this as a 
“strong” differentiation strategy because the difference in price between low-quality and high-
quality is the difference in the high-type’s valuations of these qualities subject to incentive-
compatibility.  Prices and profits associated with Benchmark 1 can be formally stated as 
follows: 
                                                     
                    
           (1) 
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In the second strategy, the entire capacity of the seller, M + N, is exhausted by setting 
a price of     for the high-quality product and a price of     for the low-quality product.  In 
effect, the seller offers high-quality service at the low-type consumers’ reservation price VLH 
and the low-quality service at low-type consumers’ reservation price VLL.  This also yields the 
traditional differentiated product line strategy but I refer to this as a “weak” differentiation 
strategy.  This is because the difference in price between low-quality and high-quality is the 
difference in the low-type’s valuations of these qualities.  Here, the low-type consumers are 
indifferent between high-quality and low-quality goods.  However, the high-type consumers 
will choose to buy the high-quality service because they obtain greater utility from consuming 
the high-quality service in this instance.   Given more buyers than capacity, product 
assignment is random.  Since seller profits are independent of the composition of buyers, 
prices and profits associated with Benchmark 2 are given as:  
                                                             (2)  
   
The “strong” differentiation in Benchmark 1 improves on the “weak” differentiation in 
Benchmark 2 by yielding a higher price for the high-quality product which follows from the 
fact that > 0.  However, it does not dominate Benchmark 2 because it cannot exhaust all the 
high-quality capacity as in Benchmark 2.  In particular, capacity of     remains unfilled 
since      .   As such, both benchmarks need to be retained for subsequent analysis.   
A third strategy is to focus only on serving the high-type customers with high-quality 
product.  This is an “up-market” strategy where the seller only offers the high-quality service 
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at price VHH to high-type consumers. By adopting this strategy, the seller actually gives up 
profits from the low-type consumers in order to realize the benefit of charging the high price 
of VHH  to high-type consumers. If the seller wants to include the low-type consumers in the 
market by offering the low-quality service, the price of the high-quality service has to be 
lowered in order to prevent the high-type consumer from choosing the service targeted to the 
low-type consumer.  To prevent such degradation of profits, the seller chooses to focus 
exclusively on the high-type consumers.  I label this as Benchmark 3 and the profit arising 
from this strategy is: 
                          (3) 
 
I next set a restriction to focus on the most interesting region of my parameter space   
In particular, I posit than an “up-market” strategy wherein the seller only sells the high-quality 
product to the high-types as in Benchmark 3 is dominated by the full-coverage strategies 
embodied in either Benchmark 1 or 2.  Intuitively, I expect ignoring the low-type segment to 
be too costly.  Mathematically, I conduct my analysis here assuming that: 
                          (4) 
  
 Of course, later, I will also analyze the case where Benchmark 3 dominates both 
Benchmarks 1 and 2 and explicitly demonstrate the emergence of probabilistic quality in that 
scenario as well.    For ease in exposition, this is detailed in the Appendix.  
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3.1.4  Analysis  
Benchmarks 1 and 2 illustrate the seller’s outcomes without adopting probabilistic 
quality in the product line. I next examine what the seller can do by employing probabilistic 
quality.  Before I present this analysis, I preview how probabilistic quality can enhance 
improve on the two benchmarks.  Broadly, probabilistic quality can improve on Benchmark 1 
by reducing fallow capacity associated with this benchmark.   In contrast, probabilistic quality 
can improve on the weak differentiation associated with Benchmark 2.  Specifically, by 
including probabilistic quality, the seller can now target the high-quality product to the high-
type segment and obtain a better price for high-quality.         
With some abuse of notation, I shall variously employ the symbol   to reflect the 
probability of receiving high-quality, a subscript to denote the level of a decision variable 
under probabilistic quality, or even the strategy of employing probabilistic quality in the 
product line.  Note that when probabilistic quality is targeted to a particular segment, the 
value that buyers place on it is a linear combination of the valuations for high- and low-
quality.  That is,                   and                   .  Further, the seller 
has to set prices with incentive-compatibility in mind.  That is, buyers will compute the utility 
of selecting every product offered by the seller and choose the product which maximizes their 
utility; consequently, prices have to be set with this consideration in mind.   
At this point, it is instructive to discuss when and how probabilistic quality can arise.  
First, although I assume      , I note that probabilistic quality will never arise when 
    .  Formally, I have:  
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Result 1: Probabilistic quality will never arise when the number of high-type 
customers exceeds the available high-quality capacity, i.e., when     . 
 
Result 1 demonstrates that probabilistic quality is never optimal when     .  To prove 
this, first note that in this instance Benchmark 1 dominates Benchmark 2 because it has higher 
prices and does not now suffer from unused capacity.   Including probabilistic quality to 
improve on Benchmark 1 implies that the seller has to decide which segment probabilistic 
quality should be targeted towards.  Two cases are pertinent.  In the first case, the seller 
targets probabilistic quality to the high-type segment.  In its most general form, this case 
involves selling both high-quality and probabilistic quality to the high-type segment so that is 
what I will analyze.   Accordingly, the seller announces some capacity of high-quality and 
some capacity of probabilistic quality targeted to the high-type segment with actual 
assignments being random.  I need the following incentive-compatibility constraints:  
  
                
                                                               (5a) 
 
                
                            (5b) 
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Equation (5a) reveals that the prices for the two components in probabilistic quality are 
identical to the prices for these components in Benchmark 1 (please see equation (1)).  
Equation (5b) reveals that the price obtained for the high-quality product is identical to 
Benchmark 1.  As such, probabilistic quality targeted to the high-type segment cannot 
improve on Benchmark 1 and given transaction costs, c, actually does worse.   
Next, consider the case when probabilistic quality is targeted to the low-type 
consumer.   In its most general form, this case involves selling both probabilistic quality and 
low-quality to the low-type segment so that is what I will analyze.   Accordingly, the seller 
announces some capacity of probabilistic quality and the remaining capacity of low-quality 
targeted to the low-type segment with actual assignments being random.  I have 
                                         (6a) 
 
In addition, to guarantee that the high-type consumers buy the high-quality product I need:  
 
 
               
               
   
        
                                
                
   
Since                        ; 
                                            
                                               (6b) 
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In this event, the price obtained for the high-quality component in probabilistic quality is 
lower than that obtained by selling the high-quality to the high-type customer in Benchmark 1 
(    <               since > 0) whereas the price of the low-quality component remains 
unchanged.  Moreover, offering probabilistic quality to the low-type also degrades the price 
that the seller can charge to the high-type consumer because of “cannibalization.”  
Specifically, the price of the high-quality product drops from             to     
                                                Interestingly, the 
degradation in price is more pronounced as probabilistic quality becomes a closer substitute to 
the high-quality product (increasing  ).  Finally, the transaction costs associated with 
probabilistic quality further degrades the profits from targeting probabilistic quality to the 
low-type segment.    For all of these reasons, probabilistic quality targeted to the low-type 
segment is also unable to improve on the profits obtained via Benchmark 1.   
 Having shown that the seller will not target probabilistic quality to either the low- or 
high-type whenever     , I now focus on the case where      .   My goal is to 
describe the manner in which probabilistic quality can emerge and thereby facilitate the 
subsequent exposition.  I have:   
 
Result 2: When optimal, the strategy of probabilistic quality,  ,  can only take the 
following forms: 
a. Probabilistic quality with two quality tiers [H, ф]  where the  seller offers    high-
quality products to the high-type segment and cobbles the remaining        
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high-quality products with N low-quality products to offer probabilistic quality to 
the low-type segment.   
b. Probabilistic quality with three quality tiers [H, ф, L] where the seller offers    
high-quality products to the high-type segment and creates both probabilistic 
quality and low-quality targeted to the low-type segment.  In this event, all of the 
remaining       high-quality products and some of the N low-quality products 
are used to create probabilistic quality.   The remaining low-quality units are 
retained for separate sale to the low-type segment.   
Proof: In Appendix. 
 
Result 2 limits the options available to the seller.  In particular, the seller will never sell 
probabilistic quality to the high-type segment.  The seller always prefers to exhaust the high-
quality capacity on the high-type segment in order to obtain an attractive price.  The 
remaining unsold high-quality capacity is then sold via probabilistic quality to the low-type 
segment.  Sometimes, all of the low-quality product is used to create probabilistic quality and 
targeted to the low-type segment.  At other times, some low-quality capacity is reserved for 
separate sale to the low-type segment.  This discussion reveals that offering probabilistic 
quality and low-quality to the low-type segment via a [     offering is never optimal.   
Similarly, since      is a special case of [    , Result 2 also reveals that adopting a     
strategy targeted to the low-type segment is never optimal.   
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 Following Results 1 and 2, offering probabilistic quality implies that the seller always 
targets high-quality to the high-types and then cobbles together the unsold high-quality 
capacity      and some low-quality capacity X to create the synthetic product. When 
consumers buy this kind of service, they are not guaranteed to receive either high-quality or 
low-quality; rather, consumers obtain the high-quality service with probability    
    
      
 
and low-quality service with probability    
 
      
.   In addition, the reason why I 
invoke         can now be made clear:  this assumption ensures that there is enough 
demand for low-quality and probabilistic quality.   This, in turn, allows us to demonstrate the 
essential costs and benefits of introducing probabilistic quality without being fettered by 
constraints on   .   
In my analysis, a key decision variable is  , the amount of low-quality product that 
must be added to the excess high-quality capacity 
HnM   to create the synthetic product.   
Thus, one managerially relevant output of my model is the amount of low-quality capacity 
that should be set apart in order to offer probabilistic quality.   A second managerially relevant 
output of my model is the price and probability associated with probabilistic quality, and it 
turns out that deriving X also defines these variables.  Since the price for the low-quality 
product is VLL and probabilistic quality is always targeted to the low-type segment, the price 
for the probabilistic quality is                     .   From the incentive-
compatibility constraint of the high-type customers, the price of the high-quality product is:   
                                    (7) 
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Also, the cost for probabilistic quality is      , which includes both the product cost as 
well as the aforementioned transaction costs.  Under these considerations, the seller chooses X 
to maximize the following profit function: 
                                      
                              
        
      
   
ST.               (8) 
 
I find it convenient to define four levels with respect to the variable that represents the 
transaction cost associated with offering probabilistic quality, c.  I also find it convenient to 
define one specific level for the variable that represents the capacity associated with the high-
quality product, M.  In particular, I denote:  
   
         
         
        (9a) 
   
              
 
    
        (9b) 
   
   
       
         (9c) 
   
              
      
 
         
         
      (9d) 
   
            
      
        (9e) 
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3.1.5  Findings  
I am now in a position to outline the propositions that flow from analysis.   I note that 
my analytical findings unfold over two cases that differ with respect to the relative magnitude 
of   .  More specifically, these two cases are described by    
             
           
 and    
             
           
.    Broadly, these two cases reflect how much excess high-quality capacity 
exists.  It is straightforward to see that the amount of excess capacity is greater under the 
former inequality.  Considering both these cases allows my work to be general and complete.  
In addition, I note that the critical value for high-quality capacity,    
            
      
  demarcates the boundary of the two Benchmarks, 1 and 2.  If M <   , 
Benchmark 1 is relevant.  Conversely, if M > M0, then Benchmark 2 is germane.    Intuitively, 
when M is relatively small, the loss stemming from the unsold capacity in Benchmark 1 is that 
not large; consequently, this is the region where Benchmark 1 dominates Benchmark 2.  In 
contrast, when M is relatively large, the loss stemming from the unsold capacity in 
Benchmark 1 is fairly large; consequently, this is the region where Benchmark 2 dominates 
Benchmark 1.    
My first proposition pertains to the optimality and design of probabilistic quality.  
Formally, I have:  
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Proposition 1:  Regardless of the relative magnitude of   , the seller finds it profit-
enhancing to offer probabilistic quality in two distinct regions of the parameter space.  
These two regions differ in the number of segments targeted.   In Region A (two-
segment), the seller augments probabilistic quality only with the high-quality product.  
In Region B (three-segment), the seller augments probabilistic quality with both the 
high-quality product as well as the low-quality product.  Further, the products offered, 
probability associated with probabilistic quality, and prices are as in Tables 1a and 
1b
2
.  The relevant regions are depicted in Figures 1a and 1b.   
Proof:  In Appendix 
 
                                                          
2  Across the two cases, I see that the difference is mainly regarding the optimality of offering 
probabilistic quality.  In particular, probabilistic quality in the form of the [H, ф, L] solution is optimal 
over a greater region when    
             
           
.  Recall that the profitability of Benchmark 1 is 
influenced by the magnitude of    since it positively influences the number of high-quality sales.   
Thus, when    
             
           
, Benchmark 1 is not that profitable; moreover, the amount of fallow 
capacity is high; consequently, probabilistic quality improves on Benchmark 1 over a greater region as 
shown in Figure 1a.  Conversely, when    
             
           
  , Benchmark 1 is relatively profitable; 
moreover, the amount of fallow capacity is low; consequently, probabilistic quality is unable to 
improve on Benchmark 1.  These considerations are not salient with respect to Benchmark 2 because 
   does not influence its profitability; consequently, the region of optimality of [H, ф, L] is not 
impacted.    Finally, while not obvious from the Figures, the upper boundary of Region A when 
     is also altered.  Specifically, in Figure 1a, it is defined by    whereas in Figure 1b it is 
defined by   .     
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In the figures, the horizontal axis is the capacity of the high-quality product and the 
vertical axis is the seller’s transaction costs. The horizontal axis starts at    since  has to 
exceed    in order to provide excess capacity for probabilistic quality.  The starting point of 
the vertical axis is    .  
I begin by providing some intuition for the underlying drivers behind the choice of a 
product and pricing strategy ([H, ф], [H, ф, L], Benchmark 1, or Benchmark 2)   First, I 
compare probabilistic quality with Benchmark 1.  Note that with the introduction of 
probabilistic quality, the price obtained for the high-quality product goes down in relation to 
the price obtained for the high-quality product in Benchmark 1 (cannibalization).  
Specifically, in the [H, ф] offering,           
       
      
   whereas in Benchmark 1,       
    .  Similarly, in the [H, ф, L] offering,           
        
  
 whereas in Benchmark 
1,         .  This cannibalization notwithstanding, the benefit of probabilistic quality is 
that it can gainfully utilize fallow capacity.   
At this point, it is important to note the probability associated with probabilistic 
quality implicitly controls the extent of the cannibalization effect.  When   is high, there is a 
greater proportion of high-quality product in the probabilistic offer; consequently, 
cannibalization is more severe because the products are close substitutes.  On the other hand, 
when    is low (obtained by choosing a high X), it leads to a large number of units that are 
sold via probabilistic quality.  The question then arises: why does the seller not minimize the 
cannibalization effect by lowering the choice of        The answer is that selling a large 
number of units via probabilistic quality degrades profits because the transaction cost, c, 
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applies to each probabilistic sale.  It is these countervailing forces that leads to an interior 
solution for  .     
Next, I compare probabilistic quality to Benchmark 2.  The advantage of probabilistic 
quality is that the seller is able to obtain a better price for the high-quality capacity by 
targeting the high-type customer.  Specifically, in the [H, ф] offering,            
       
      
   
whereas in Benchmark 2,         .    It is straightforward to see that     in [H, ф] is always 
greater than    in Benchmark 2 since    .  Similarly, in the [H, ф, L] offering,      
     
        
  
         
 
   whereas in Benchmark 2,         (refer Table 1a and 1b) .    
Because   is less than 1, it is straightforward to see that     in [H, ф, L] is also greater than 
   in Benchmark 2.    
This discussion implies that probabilistic quality can potentially improve on the weak 
differentiation associated with Benchmark 2.  Specifically, by including probabilistic quality, 
the seller can now target the high-quality product to the high-type segment and obtain a better 
price for high-quality.           
Depending on how these drivers play out, the seller employs one of four strategies: 
[H, ф], [H, ф, L], Benchmark 1, or Benchmark 2). I now discuss the specific regions that are 
highlighted in Figures (1a) and (1b).   
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Region A: [H, Φ]. 
Across this region, the transaction cost of using probabilistic quality is relatively low.  
As such, the concern about profit erosion from transaction costs is not that salient. Thus, it is 
optimal to minimize the cannibalization effect by exhausting all the low-quality product to 
create probabilistic quality.  I thus obtain the [H, Φ] strategy.    
 
Region B: [H, Φ, L]. 
In region B, the transaction cost of using probabilistic quality is higher than in region 
A for any given .   Here, the concern about profit erosion stemming from transaction costs 
is relevant.  Consequently, the seller cannot minimize the cannibalization effect by 
indiscriminately using a large number of low-quality products to create probabilistic quality.  
As such, the seller does not exhaust the low-quality capacity while creating the probabilistic 
offer but rather reserves some low-quality product for separate sale via [H, Φ, L].    
 
Benchmarks  
In the Figures, I also show that as transaction cost increases, the optimal solution 
reverts to the benchmarks. The seller’s efforts to mitigate cannibalization inherent in 
probabilistic quality are hampered by the profit erosion stemming from increased transaction 
costs; consequently, the benchmarks emerge as the optimal solution.     
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Boundaries of Regions  
In the case of    
             
           
 (Figure 1a), the frontier between B and C can be 
understood as follows.  For a fixed transaction cost c, as the capacity of the high-quality 
product M increases, the attractiveness of [H, Φ, L] relative to Benchmark 1 increases. This is 
because the profitability of Benchmark 1 is independent of M whereas [H, Φ, L] increases in 
profitability as M increases.   Simply put, probabilistic quality is more attractive with greater 
excess high-quality capacity.  Therefore, for a given level of transaction costs, the payoff of 
adopting Strategy [H, Φ, L] exceeds that of Benchmark 1 if M is large enough.   
For both    
             
           
  and    
             
           
 (Figures 2a and 2b), the frontier 
between regions B and D can be understood as follows.  For a fixed transaction cost c, as M 
increases, the seller switches from [H, Φ, L] to Benchmark 2.  The reason is as follows. As M 
increases, the payoffs of strategies [H, Φ, L] and Benchmark 2 increase because both of them 
exhaust the high-quality product and increases in its capacity allow greater use of an attractive 
product.   Thus, the comparison of [H, Φ, L] and Benchmark 2 depends on how fast profits 
increase in M.  Differentiating both profits with respect to M, I get: 
             
  
             (10a) 
      
  
         
    
    
      (10b) 
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I can show that 
      
  
 
             
  
 indicating a slower speed of increase with M for 
[H, Φ, L]. Thus, beyond a critical M, Benchmark 2 is better than [H, Φ, L]. 
Having discussed my results pertaining to Benchmarks 1 and 2, I highlight that 
probabilistic quality can also emerge under Benchmark 3.  As mentioned previously, this 
analysis is detailed in the Appendix.  In effect, despite cannibalization, probabilistic quality 
benefits the seller via sales of unsold capacity as well as the inclusion of a previously 
neglected segment.   
I next focus on how the design of probabilistic quality is impacted when the number of 
high-quality demanders,   , and transaction costs, c, change.  I focus on these two variables 
because many firms are likely to experience changes in these variables on account of their 
other marketing activities and advances in technology, respectively.  As such, it is 
managerially relevant to examine how the design of probabilistic quality is impacted by 
changes in these variables.  Formally, I have:   
 
Proposition 2a: Regardless of the relative magnitude of   , whenever the seller 
adopts [H, Φ, L]:  
(i) The probability associated with probabilistic quality,   is decreasing in 
the number of high-quality demanders,   , and increasing in 
transaction costs, c. 
30 
 
(ii) The price of probabilistic quality,   , is decreasing in the number of 
high-quality demanders,   , and increasing in transaction costs, c. 
(iii) The quantity of product sold probabilistically,        varies non-
monotonically in the number of high-quality demanders,    , and is 
decreasing in transaction costs, c.    
 
Mathematically: 
  
   
  ,  
  
  
    
   
   
  ,  
   
  
    
 
         
   
          
 
 
 and 
         
   
          
 
 
 , and 
 
         
  
   
 Proof: In Appendix  
 
First, since    is a linear function of  , they share the same comparative statics.  
Thus, in the discussions below, the explanations for    and   are similar.   
 To facilitate understanding, I discuss the intuition behind the comparative statics 
associated with    and          under two cases: when    is either relatively small or 
when     is relatively large.  Specifically, my discussion unfolds separately for the cases 
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when    
 
 
  and    
 
 
.  When the amount of high-quality demanders is relatively small, 
the idle high-quality capacity that can be used in creating probabilistic quality,      , is 
large.  Since   
      
        
, increases in X lower    here however,   is not very sensitive to  
changes in X because         is large. Given that   increases linearly in  , I can 
alternatively say that the price of the probabilistic product is not very sensitive to changes in 
X.  In this light, the best way to respond to an increase in    is to increase the total amount of 
probabilistic product offered by increasing       .  Such a strategy proves profit-
maximizing because the drop in price for probabilistic quality is more than compensated by 
the increased volume associated with probabilistic quality.   This is the reason why  
   
   
     
  
   
   and  
         
   
   when    
 
 
  
 Next, when the amount of high-quality demanders is relatively large, the idle high-
quality capacity that can be used in creating probabilistic quality,       , is small.  Since 
  
      
        
, decreases in X improve    moreover,   is very sensitive to changes in X 
because        is small.   Given that     increases linearly in  , I can alternatively say 
that the price of the probabilistic product is very sensitive to changes in X.  Thus, here it is 
prudent for the seller to decrease the capacity utilized for probabilistic selling,         
thereby leading to an upward pressure on price.  Nevertheless, since     also decreases as 
   increases, this leads to a decrease in quality with an attendant downward pressure on price.  
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The overall impact of both these pressures on price remains negative; consequently,  
   
   
     
  
   
   and  
         
   
   when    
 
 
 .  
 Finally, the comparative statics with respect to transaction costs, c, are 
straightforward.  As costs increase, the seller’s best response is to increase price as in a 
standard monopoly offering.  This is achieved by increasing the quality of the probabilistic 
product,  , with a corresponding increase in       This implies a decrease in the amount of 
probabilistic quality offered,      .  
 
Proposition 2b: Regardless of the relative magnitude of   , whenever the seller 
adopts [H, Φ]:   
(i) The probability associated with probabilistic quality,   is decreasing in 
the number of high-quality demanders,   , but independent of the 
transaction cost, c. 
(ii) The price of probabilistic quality,   , is decreasing in the number of 
high-quality demanders,     but independent of the transaction cost, c. 
(iii) The quantity of product sold probabilistically,      , decreases in 
the number of high-quality demanders,   , but is independent of the 
transaction costs, c.   
 
 Mathematically:  
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  , 
  
  
    
   
   
  , 
   
  
    
 
         
   
    and  
         
  
   
 Proof: In Appendix  
 
As in Proposition 2a,    and  , share the same comparative statics.  Thus, in the 
discussions below, the explanations for    and   are similar.   
To understand Proposition 2b, note that the amount of product sold probabilistically is 
         as     in the two-segment solution.  Here, the total amount of low-quality 
capacity involved in the probabilistic quality package is constant and equal to  ; 
consequently,   
      
        
     In this event, an increase in the number of high-type 
customers,   , means that both      and         decrease; however, the decrease 
in       has a stronger impact on    than the decrease in        , leading to a 
decrease in   with an attendant decrease in   .  Moreover, since X    , transaction costs 
have no impact on           and   .  
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Finally, I examine the impact of probabilistic quality on consumer surplus.  I have:  
Proposition 3:  Regardless of the relative size of   :  
(i) Offering probabilistic quality improves consumer surplus when the high-
quality capacity is relatively low (        
(ii) Offering probabilistic quality may either improve or degrade consumer 
surplus when high-quality capacity is relatively high (       – it 
depends on the proportion of high-type consumers assumed to avail 
themselves of the high-quality product in Benchmark 2.  
Proof: In Appendix.  
 
To understand Proposition 3, first note that any surplus that arises comes only from the 
high-type segment through their consumption of the high-quality product since they never 
consume probabilistic quality - the low-type segment is always kept at their valuation.  Now 
consider the case when the high-quality capacity is relatively low.  In this event, the relevant 
benchmark (1) involves leaving some high-quality capacity idle. The introduction of 
probabilistic quality forces the seller to further lower the price of the high-quality product; 
consequently, high-type consumers now enjoy even greater levels of surplus.  This is the 
source of improved consumer surplus.   
Now consider the case when high-quality capacity is relatively high.  In this event, the 
relevant benchmark (2) involves using the entire capacity.   Here, the high-type consumer 
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obtains greater surplus from consuming the high-quality product at price      in Benchmark 2 
relative to consuming the high-quality product under the strategy affiliated with probabilistic 
quality (                                                                  
although both provide positive surplus.  However, there is no way to fix the number of high-
type consumers that are able to avail themselves of the attractive price of     for the high-
quality product under Benchmark 2 since allocation is random.  Consequently, if this number 
is not too large, probabilistic quality provides greater surplus.  In contrast, if this number is 
relatively large, the surplus provided by probabilistic quality is exceeded by the surplus 
enjoyed in Benchmark 2.   
 
3.1.6  Additional Analysis  
I now explicitly address the issue of how the seller arrives in a world where capacity 
level for the high-quality product exceeds demand.    Consider a seller with initial capacity N 
of low-quality products.  Now, as the market matures, there is an opportunity to target an 
emergent high-type segment (premium suites, 50Mps internet, etc.).    Unfortunately, 
however, this emergent high-type segment is characterized by demand uncertainty.  
Nevertheless, to take advantage of this opportunity, the seller embarks to build capacity M
*
 
for the high-quality product with some convex cost function.  This capacity choice is 
undertaken before demand is realized.  Next, demand is realized and the seller has to select a 
strategy given M
*
, N, and the realized value of   .   If the realization of    is such that 
     
 , I obtain the world that I analyze and in which probabilistic quality can emerge.  In 
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contrast, if the realization of    is such that      
 , the seller will never offer probabilistic 
quality.   
To incorporate demand uncertainty, I employ the uniform distribution for high-quality 
demand:            .  The goal of my analysis here is to demonstrate that even when the 
seller chooses capacity, the optimal level of high-quality capacity is greater than the lower 
bound for the support of    (i.e., M* > 0).   If this is true, there is a non-zero probability that 
M* will be greater than the realized value of   .  In other words, the world that I confine my 
analysis to, namely, one in which capacity for the high-quality product exceeds demand, can 
indeed arise in the first place.  Formally, I obtain:  
 
Proposition 4:   When the seller chooses capacity for the high-quality product 
in the face of demand uncertainty, the optimal capacity choice M* is greater 
than the lower bound for the support of    .  This implies that a world in 
which capacity for the high-quality exceeds demand can indeed arise in the 
first place.   
Proof: In Appendix.  
 
Finally, for completeness, I show via numerical examples that when the seller chooses 
capacity for high-quality, both [H, Φ] as well as [H, Φ, L] do indeed emerge as the profit-
maximizing offerings (please see Table 2).  Moreover, the former arises for a relatively low 
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value of transaction cost whereas the latter arises for a relatively high value of transaction 
cost.  In short, endogenizing capacity choice does not eliminate the emergence of probabilistic 
quality. 
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4.  DISCUSSION 
 
My research adds to the growing literature on the probabilistic aspects of market 
exchanges.  Indeed, the numerous marketplace examples of probabilistic quality motivate my 
formal study on this topic.   Broadly, I contribute to this literature by focusing on the design 
and pricing of probabilistic quality.    
In my analysis, I find that there are three distinct routes by which probabilistic quality 
can enhance seller profits.  First, sellers employing a “strong” differentiation strategy with a 
view to benefit from better price realization while tolerating some fallow capacity can utilize 
probabilistic quality to improve capacity utilization.  Here, the introduction of a product that 
is in between the high and low-quality offerings actually leads to increased cannibalization of 
the price obtained for the high-quality product; however, this is mitigated by pushing the 
quality inherent in probabilistic quality towards the low-quality offering by packing in more 
low-quality products.  This mitigation, in turn, is constrained by the fact that selling large 
numbers of probabilistic quality erodes profits on account of the transaction costs associated 
with probabilistic quality.  These opposing forces lead to an interior solution for the 
probability associated with probabilistic quality.    
Second, sellers utilizing their entire capacity but sacrificing margins by following a 
“weak” differentiation strategy can use probabilistic quality to enhance profits by now 
targeting the high-quality product to high-type consumers with correspondingly higher 
margins.  Again, to minimize cannibalization, the seller would prefer to push the quality 
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inherent in probabilistic quality towards the low-quality offering by packing in more low-
quality products.  However, selling large numbers of probabilistic quality erodes profits on 
account of the transaction costs associated with probabilistic quality.  As before, I thus obtain 
an interior solution.  
 Third, sellers following an “upmarket” strategy can also benefit from employing 
probabilistic quality.   Here, the seller ignores the low-type segment completely despite excess 
high-quality capacity as well as the availability of the full amount of low-quality capacity.  
Although probabilistic quality induces cannibalization, the twin benefits of selling the fallow 
high-quality and the full amount of low-quality capacity to the low-type consumers can prove 
to be profit enhancing.   
My research also reveals an important role for the magnitude of transaction costs in 
deciding which products should be included in the product line. I find that increases in 
transaction cost move the seller away from [H, ф] to [H, ф, L].    This is because increased 
transaction costs degrade the profits from utilizing probabilistic quality; consequently, the 
seller now reserves some low-type capacity for separate sale to the low-type segment even 
though its inclusion in probabilistic quality could mitigate the cannibalization effect.  Overall, 
my results here speak to the impact of transaction costs on the design of the product line when 
offering probabilistic quality.    
Yet another important contribution of my work is the explicit delineation of the 
probability and pricing associated with probabilistic quality.  I demonstrate the impact of two 
important parameters, namely, the number of high-quality demanders,   , and transaction 
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costs, c, on the pricing and probability associated with probabilistic quality.  My focus on 
these variables is particularly germane since many firms are likely to experience changes in 
these variables on account of their other marketing activities and advances in technology, 
respectively.  
A very interesting finding of my study is that probabilistic quality can improve 
consumer surplus even in the presence of transaction costs. This accrues because of two 
reasons: lower prices for the high-type consumer (relative to Benchmark 1) and potentially 
steering more high-quality product to the high-type consumer (relative to Benchmark 2).  
Here, it is interesting to contrast my results with Leffler, Rucker and Munn (2000) where the 
authors find that although the initiative to measure quality lies with the seller (this is also the 
case in Milgrom and Weber 1982), such measurements are at the expense of consumer 
surplus. However, in my study, the seller chooses to introduce uncertainty in the actual 
product that the customer receives. While this introduces a dissipative transaction cost, lower 
prices or additional quantity enjoyed by high-type consumers improves surplus.   
Finally, I explicitly demonstrate that a world in which the high-quality capacity 
exceeds demand can indeed arise even when capacity choice is a decision variable.   
Specifically, given uncertainty in the demand associated with the high-quality product, I find 
that the seller will choose a level of high-quality capacity that is strictly greater than the lower 
bound of the demand distribution.  This finding provides the proper logical motivation for my 
model context.   
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Of course, my work is not without limitations.  While this study is sharply focused on 
probabilistic quality in a vertical context to demonstrate its viability, I have omitted certain 
aspects that merit further attention. First, given uncertainty in product, it is natural that 
customer risk-aversion will play a major role. However, generalizing this to the real 
marketplace would be an empirical question where customer valuations and risk-preferences 
need to be examined carefully.  Second, given the viability of probabilistic quality, it is 
possible that the monopolist can offer multiple tiers of probabilistic quality, with varying 
probabilities of obtaining the high-quality product. Given recent research on customized 
pricing in high-technology environment (see, for example, Syam, Ruan and Hess 2005, Chen 
and Iyer 2002, Ansari and Mela 2003), this is an important consideration where the seller can, 
in principle, offer as many tiers as the number of customers. However, deciding on the 
number of tiers and the associated probabilities is not a simple task; thus, it is beyond the 
scope of the current work.  Finally, including temporal  variation in willingness to pay (see, 
for example, Desiraju and Shugan 1999) and examining the impact of competition are also 
worthy of future research consideration.     
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Table1a:  Product Offerings across the Parameter Space - case where    
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Strategy [H, Φ and L]:  Region B  
Same as the case involving         
 
     
Benchmark 1 : Region C 
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Table1b:  Product Offerings across the Parameter Space - case where    
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Strategy [H, Φ] : Region A 
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Prices and profits are the same as the case with  
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Table 2:  Numerical Example to Demonstrate Emergence of Probabilistic Quality Under 
Capacity Choice 
 
46 
 
Example 1: Low contracting costs leading to [H,  ] solution for some realizations of     (     
 
       ,        ,         ,         ,        ,     ,        ,       and       . 
        and            
   0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Strategy B2                                           B1 B1 
  0 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 0 0 
 
 
 
Example 2: High contracting costs leading to [H,    ] solution for some realizations of     (       
 
       ,        ,         ,         ,        ,       ,        ,       and       . 
        and            
   0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Strategy B2 B2 B2                                 B1 B1 B1 
  0 0 0 6 8 8 7 0 0 0 
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Figure 1a: Selling Strategies,    
             
           
 
48 
 
 
 
Figure 1b: Selling Strategies,    
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Appendix 
Notation: 
   Capacity of high-quality product 
   Capacity of low-quality product 
    Market size of high-type consumers 
    Market size of low-type consumers 
     High-type consumers’ valuation of high-quality product 
     High-type consumers’ valuation of low-quality product 
     Low-type consumers’ valuation of high-quality product 
     Low-type consumers’ valuation of low-quality product 
     High-type consumers’ valuation of probabilistic quality product 
     Low-type consumers’ valuation of probabilistic quality product 
   Probability of obtaining high-quality product under probabilistic quality 
    Price of high-quality product 
    Price of low-quality product 
    Price of probabilistic quality product 
    Unit cost of offering high-quality product 
    Unit cost of offering low-quality product 
    Unit cost of offering probabilistic quality product 
   Unit contracting cost of offering probabilistic quality product 
   Amount of low-quality used in probabilistic quality product 
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First, observe that there is no benefit in targeting probabilistic quality to the high-type 
segment.  This is understood as follows.  Consider the comparison of introducing probabilistic 
quality with Benchmark 1.   Since    < M, if the seller wants to target the high-type with 
probabilistic quality then each high-type buyer of probabilistic quality is precluded from buying 
the high-quality offering directly.  Prices are obtained via incentive-compatibility and are 
identical to that described in equations (5a) and (5b).  Accordingly, the profit from selling a unit 
of probabilistic quality is                                           and 
the profit from selling a unit of high-quality is               .  Since the latter exceeds 
the former by the positive quality,                      , it is straightforward to 
conclude that the seller will not replace direct sales of high-quality by probabilistic quality.    
In contrast, targeting probabilistic quality to the low-type segment  has the potential to: 
(i) increase unit sales from low-type consumers in Benchmark 1 by utilizing fallow capacity, (ii) 
increase price charged for the high-quality product sold to high-type consumers in Benchmark 2, 
and, (iii) increase unit sales by serving the ignored low-type consumers in Benchmark 3.   Thus, 
probabilistic quality targeted to the low-type segment has the potential to increase profits. 
 
Now, the two segments value probabilistic quality as follows:  
                        (A1) 
                        (A2) 
 
Price of the low-quality product: 
                (A3) 
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The price of probabilistic quality is obtained from the following incentive-compatibility 
constraint:  
                            
                ; for        
                            (A4) 
The price of the high-quality product is obtained from the following incentive-compatibility 
constraints:  
 I need                 and                 to guarantee that high-type 
consumers buy high-quality product. 
  
                                
                
   
 
Since                          
                                            
                                     (A5) 
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I now turn to the specific proofs. I begin with Result 2 and then turn to the propositions. 
Manner of Emergence of Probabilistic Quality (Result 2) and Proposition 1: 
First, I show that        is never optimal.   
Proof: With       the seller does not offer high-quality product to the market, the entire high-
quality capacity is used to create the probabilistic quality. Suppose the seller uses   low-quality 
and M high-quality products in the probabilistic offer. Thus,   
 
   
 
The seller’s profit is: 
                          
         
          
   
     
   
   
             
                          
 
This profit is lower than                   .   Thus,        is dominated by 
Benchmark 2. 
 
Next, I examine the three-segment solution: high-quality + probabilistic quality + low-quality 
strategy: 
 
Here, X low-quality units are sold with      high-quality units together as probabilistic 
quality. The decision variable in the analysis is X. The probabilistic quality product is targeted to 
low-type consumers,    high-quality products are targeted to high-type consumers while 
probabilistic quality and low-quality product are sold to low-type consumers. 
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Probability of getting high-quality product =   
    
      
    (A6) 
 
Profits from Offering Probabilistic Quality 
The seller’s profit is: 
                                       
                                 
        
      
     (A7) 
 
First order condition yields: 
  
  
       
         
 
             (A8) 
     
       
   
         (A9) 
Thus,   
                
       
   
      (A10)  
And,                                      (A11) 
 
Second order condition yields 
   
   
  
                              
           
  , since   
                        
     
         
 
        maximizes profit. 
 
I now have two conditions involving    that shape the probabilistic quality offer: 
1.      
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From the expression for   ;      implies   
   
      
.  (Note that this inequality, given 
(A9), ensures that the probability associated with high-quality never exceeds 1).   
When     , probabilistic quality does not arise. 
2.      
From the expression for   ,      implies   
         
           
.  
When     , there is not enough low-quality product to put in the probabilistic quality. 
The maximum amount of low-quality product that can be used is N. Thus, when     , 
the seller sets     . I thus have the two segment solution [H, Φ] where the seller just 
offers the high-quality and the probabilistic quality product. The associated profit is thus 
obtained using the expressions for the prices,   and    (which is now equal to  ) in (A7) 
to get:  
 
   
                 
    
      
                   (A12) 
 
When       , the seller finds it optimal to offer probabilistic quality while setting 
some low-quality capacity aside to be offered as it is and I get the three segment solution 
[H, Φ, L]. The condition        , given the expression for    from (A8), translates 
to  
         
           
   
   
      
 and the associated profit is obtained by substituting the 
expressions for the prices and    in (A7) to get (as expressed in equation (A11)). 
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Summarizing, I obtain the following two probabilistic quality strategies [H, ф, L] and [H, Φ] 
which is Result 2 for the seller based on different regions of the parameter space: 
When 
         
           
   
   
      
, I get the three segment solution [H, Φ, L]: “high quality plus 
probabilistic quality plus low quality product” strategy. The profit is: 
    
                                  
 
When   
         
           
, I have the two segment solution [H, Φ] where high and probabilistic 
quality are offered (no low-quality product). The profit is: 
   
                 
    
      
            
 
I have: 
 
         
           
   
   
      
                                          
  
         
           
                                      
                (A13)  
where the critical value of the transaction cost   
         
           
   , from equation (9a). 
 
Optimal Solution:  Comparing Probabilistic Quality to Benchmarks 1 and 2 
 
Comparing Benchmark 1 and Benchmark 2, I have 
 
              
            
         (A14) 
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(where  is as defined in (9e)) 
 
I now consider the above two cases separately: 
 
A: High- quality capacity is relatively low:          (Benchmark 1 is relevant) 
Comparing profits using equations 1 and 2, it can be easily seen that         in this region 
and therefore the relevant benchmark in this region is                            . 
When   
   
      
; probabilistic quality is never optimal as this results in     .  
When 
         
           
   
   
      
, as seen earlier, I have the three segment solution [H, Φ, L]. 
    
                                  
Comparing this to    , I obtain 
 
  
              
 
    
     
      
  
              
 
    
     
      
      (A15) 
where the critical value of the transaction cost   
              
 
    
    from equation (9b). 
Now comparing the profit of the two segment solution using (A12) with benchmark 1 yields: 
 
 
 
 
 
  
               
        
        
 
        
    
     
  
               
        
        
 
        
    
     
     (A16) 
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where the critical value of the transaction cost   
               
        
        
 
        
    from equation 
(9d). 
From equations (A13) and (A15) above (and using the appropriate values of    and   ), it is 
evident that the three segment solution would arise only when         which is possible 
only when  
         
           
 
              
 
    
 . 
This implies:   
   
             
           
         (A17) 
Thus, when    exceeds this critical limit, the three segment solution does not arise when 
       as depicted in Figure 1b. If    is below this critical value, the three segment 
solution arises as in Figure 1a. 
Finally, looking at the optimality of the two segment solution using (A13) and (A16), I find that 
the two segment solution is optimal when             . Comparing these using equations 
(9a) and (9d), I get 
             when    
             
           
 and              when    
             
           
 
again corresponding to figures 1a and 1b. 
The above comparisons are summarized below: 
When     
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 
         
           
 
               
        
        
 
        
 
 
   
      
 
              
 
    
 
 
         
           
 
              
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
          
         
           
                   
     
         
           
   
              
 
    
                   
       
              
 
    
                       
   
 
 
When    
             
           
 
 
         
           
 
               
        
        
 
        
 
 
   
      
 
              
 
    
 
 
         
           
 
              
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
          
               
        
        
 
        
                 
                        
       
               
        
        
 
        
                       
   
 
 
B: High- quality capacity is relatively high:      (Benchmark 2 is relevant) 
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Using equations 1 and 2, I can see that        , and thus the relevant benchmark is      
              . 
 
    Again, when 
         
           
   
   
      
,     
     
  and I have the three segment solution: 
    
                                  
 
     Comparing this profit with    , I have: 
 
  
   
       
     
     
  
   
       
     
     
       (A18) 
 
     where the critical value of the transaction cost   
   
       
    from equation (9c) 
     When   
         
           
,     
     
 and I have the two segment solution. 
   
                
    
      
           
 
Comparing this two segment probabilistic quality solution profit with Benchmark 2, I have 
 
  
    
           
    
     
  
    
           
    
     
       (A19) 
 
60 
 
Similar to the logic in part A earlier, I compare the boundaries of c in the discussions above: 
(a) 
         
           
 and 
    
           
 
From     (since I assume greater amount of low-quality capacity),  
I get 
    
           
 
         
           
  
        
         
           
    
      
(b) 
   
       
 and 
   
      
 
   
       
 
   
      
 is trivially true 
 
(c) 
   
       
 and 
         
           
 
From      
  
 
   
       
 
         
           
 = 
    
          
           
 
               
      
                   
 
               
  
    
         
 
               
     
 
since          
 
Thus, 
   
       
 
         
           
  is always true. 
 
This allows us to clearly summarize the optimal regions as follows: 
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Proposition 2a: Regardless of the relative magnitude of   ,whenever the seller adopts 
[H, Φ, L]:  
(i) The probability associated with probabilistic quality,   is decreasing in 
the number of high-quality demanders,   , and increasing in transaction 
costs, c. 
(ii) The price of probabilistic quality,   , is decreasing in the number of high-
quality demanders,   , and increasing in transaction costs, c. 
(iii) The quantity of product sold probabilistically,         varies non-
monotonically in the number of high-quality demanders,    , and is 
decreasing in transaction costs, c.    
 
Mathematically: 
  
   
  ,  
  
  
    
   
   
  ,  
   
  
    
 
         
   
          
 
 
 and 
         
   
          
 
 
 , and 
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Proof:  For the three segment solution [H, Φ, L], I note that     
       
   
 from equation (A9) 
and the comparative statics for   immediately follow. The results for the probabilistic price also 
follow since from equation (A4), I see that    is just a linear, increasing function of  . 
For the results involving    and  , in the [H, Φ, L] solution, I first note that the amount of 
probabilistic quality sold is      
 . Now,     
         
 
       ; thus,  
      
   
         
 
 
            
        
  
  
  
 
 
 
         
  
   
      
        
  
   
 
 
 
 
 
         
        
           
 
 
           
 
 
  
proving the results relating to variation in    and  . 
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Proposition 2b: Regardless of the relative magnitude of   , whenever the seller adopts 
[H, Φ]:   
(i) The probability associated with probabilistic quality,   is decreasing in the 
number of high-quality demanders,   , but independent of the transaction 
cost, c. 
(ii) The price of probabilistic quality,   , is decreasing in the number of high-
quality demanders,     but independent of the transaction cost, c. 
(iii) The quantity of product sold probabilistically,       , decreases in 
the number of high-quality demanders,   , but is independent of the 
transaction costs, c.   
 
Proof: For the two segment solution [H, ], the seller exhausts the entire low-quality capacity 
towards building the probabilistic quality. Thus,      and therefore using (A6),  
    
    
      
 
 
   
  
   
    
   
   
  
   
         
   
 
Again, as in proposition 2a, the price of the probabilistic quality   is simply an increasing linear 
function of   and thus shares the same relationship with   and   . 
Finally, since      
        , for the two segment solution, 
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and  
        
  
   
      
 
Results when Benchmark 3 is relevant 
Here:                     
 
Results 1 and Result 2 still hold when Benchmark 3 is the relative benchmark.  The explanation 
follows.  
 
In my earlier discussion of Result 1, I prove that when     , all the strategies using 
probabilistic quality are dominated by Benchmark 1. If                    , it is obvious 
that probabilistic quality is still dominated.  As such, Result 1 still holds. 
 
With regard to Result 2, note that, as before, the seller always prefers to exhaust the high-quality 
capacity on the high-type segment to obtain an attractive price.  The remaining unsold high-
quality capacity is then sold via probabilistic quality to the low-type segment.  In my earlier 
discussion of Result 2, I demonstrate that offering probabilistic quality and low-quality to the 
low-type segment via a [     offering is never optimal because [     strategy is dominated by 
Benchmark 2. When                    , it is obvious that [     strategy is also dominated 
by Benchmark 3.  
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By comparing     with     and    , I conclude that    
    
        
    
        
             
        
    
        
            
   
 
and 
 
        
                
         
             
        
                
         
            
   
 
Summary: 
            
    
       
 
               
         
          is the relative benchmark 
            
    
       
 
               
         
                  are the relative benchmarks 
 
When Benchmark 3 is the relative benchmark,  comparison of  the profits of Benchmark 3 with 
profits of [H, ] and [H, L] yields:    
 
(1)    
      
  
      
   
                                   
 
          
  
 
(2)    
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(3) As I discussed earlier on [H, ] and [H, L] strategy, I have:  
 
         
           
   
   
      
                                          
  
         
           
                                      
             
where the critical value of the transaction cost   
         
           
   , from equation (9a).  
 
Summary: 
When                     
  is the optimal  
When             
   
      
       
  is the optimal  
Otherwise     
 is the optimal. 
 
I conclude that when Benchmark 3 is the relative benchmark, Results 1 and 2 still hold and 
probabilistic quality can still emerge as long as contracting costs are not too high.    
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Proposition 3: Regardless of the relative size of   : 
 (i) offering probabilistic quality improves consumer surplus when the high-quality   
capacity is relatively low (      
 (ii) offering probabilistic quality degrades consumer surplus when high-quality capacity 
is relatively high (     .   
 
The consumer surplus in benchmark 1, benchmark 2, and probabilistic quality strategies are: 
 
Surplus from Benchmark 1: 
In Benchmark 1, low-type consumers don’t enjoy any surplus.   Surplus only comes from high-
type consumers and is given as          . So, the overall consumer surplus is: 
              . 
 
Surplus from Benchmark 2: 
In this Benchmark, low-type consumers again have zero surplus.   Surplus comes from high-type 
consumers and is given as           .  However, the number of high-type consumers able to 
avail themselves of the high-quality product is not defined a priori (product assignment is 
random between the high-type and low-type).   Suppose there are   (      ) high-type 
consumers who end up purchasing high-quality product at    .    Then, the overall consumer 
surplus is: 
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             . 
 
Surplus from Probabilistic Quality Strategy: 
In probabilistic quality strategy also, the low type consumers do not enjoy surplus. The high-type 
consumer’s surplus is the same for both solutions (three- and two- segment) and is: 
                            
Thus, the overall consumer surplus here is: 
                                 
Comparing this to the benchmarks, I get 
 
                                                 
                                                       
      . 
 
                                                
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Thus, the aggregate consumer surplus with probabilistic quality is greater than the 
consumer surplus in Benchmark 1, and is conditionally better than the consumer surplus in 
Benchmark 2.  It depends on the number of high-type consumers who are able to avail of the 
opportunity of buying the high-quality product,  . 
 
Proposition 4:   When the seller chooses capacity for the high-quality product in 
the face of demand uncertainty, the optimal capacity choice M* is greater than the 
lower bound for the support of    .  This implies that a world in which capacity 
for the high-quality exceeds demand can indeed arise in the first place.   
 
Following the discussion with no demand uncertainty; there are four strategies the seller can 
adopt: 
(1) Benchmark 1: Sell high-quality to the high-type consumers at             and sell low-
quality to low-type consumers at    . 
(2) Benchmark 2: Sell high-quality to both low- and high- type consumers at     and sell low-
quality to low-type consumers at    . 
(3) Benchmark 3: Only sell high-quality to high-type consumers at    . 
(4) Probabilistic quality: Sell high-quality to high-type consumers, and sell both probabilistic and 
low-quality products to low-type consumers. 
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Assume the demand of high-type consumers follows a uniform distribution between 0 to   . The 
probability density is 
 
   
. 
 
Assuming a convex cost for capacity of the form, 
   
 
, the seller maximizes the following 
objective function:    
       
 
   
                       
   
 
    
   
 
  
Where: 
                                       
                   
                        
     
  
                                                                                                                           
   
 
                             
         
        
                         
  
0 Hn
H
n
1
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The next step is to prove that the optimal level of high-quality product offered   is positive: 
When the seller chooses    , the seller offers only low-quality products. The only strategy 
the seller can adopt is to sell low-quality product to low-type consumers at        and the 
profit is     . I then relax the condition on  from    to      If I can find any strategy 
with a positive value of   that exceed profits of      , I then conclude the optimal level of  
  
of the profit maximization problem:   
   
 
   
 
  
                       
   
 
    
   
 
 
is greater than zero.  
Consider the following strategy.  Suppose the seller sells  high-quality products to high type 
consumers at             and sells   low-quality product to low type consumers at    . 
   
 
   
 
 
                       
 
   
   
 
                          
   
 
, 
                   
                 
 
    
      
   
 
  
F.O.C 
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S.O.C 
   
   
  
                
   
      
  When    
                   
                     
,   gets the maximum 
   
                   
 
                        
           . 
Since                   , then 
  
                   
                     
  . 
 
 
 
 
